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Kurt Benton Snedeker, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
Nanette Rolfe, Director, Utah 
State Driver License Division, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20070078-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and McHugh. 
This matter is before the court on Appellee's motion to 
strike a portion of Appellant's reply brief. Appellee contends 
that the argument section identified as "II.B" does not comply 
with rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
This court generally declines to consider matters raised for 
the first time in the reply brief. Beacham v. Fritzi Realty 
Corp. , 2006 UT App 35, 16, n.l, 131 P.3d 271. Because the 
argument at issue here was not raised in the opening brief or in 
response to a "new matter set forth in the opposing brief," this 
court declines to address it. See Mi Vida Enters, v. Steen-
Adams, 2005 UT App 400, S[13, n.3, 122 P.3d 144 (quoting Utah R. 
App. P. 2 4(c)). 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that motion to strike is 
granted. 
Dated thi s c r ^ day of August, 2 007 
FOR THE C 
James* 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on August 2, 2007, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposxted in the United States mail or 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KURT BENTON SNEDEKER, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
NANNETTE ROLFE, 
Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 2007078-CA 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Appellee misstates and misconstrues Appellant's argument to support 
affirmance of the district court's ruling. The trooper in question violated Appellant's 
constitutionally protected rights against unreasonable search and seizure when he 
erroneously stopped Mr. Snedeker for a violation of state insurance laws without a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that he was committing a crime. At the time of the 
seizure the trooper only knew that his computer read-out indicated the vehicle was owned 
by a business and that his data base indicated no insurance was found on the vehicle. 
The Appellee's second argument should be stricken as appellee misstates the 
factual history of the case and failed to cross-appeal on this separate issue, which is 
substantively in error and does not support the position urged by her. Fourth 
1 
Amendment jurisprudence and the accompanying exclusionary rule apply to these district 
court proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A POLICE OFFICER IS WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL 
JUSTIFICATION TO STOP A VEHICLE BASED ON NOTHING 
MORE THAN A COMPUTER READ-OUT OF "NO INSURANCE 
FOUND" WHERE NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON WHO 
IS DRIVING THE VEHICLE AND THE VEHICLE IS INSURED. 
Appellee misconstrues Mr. Snedeker's argument before this Court. Appellee 
states, without reference or citation, that "Petitioner [Appellant] argues that Trooper 
Gurley lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because there were possible 
innocent explanations for the indication that no insurance was found for the vehicle." 
Brief of Appellee at p. 6. This statement and the Appellee's argument that follows the 
statement distort the position of Appellant. Appellant's position is clear: 
In this case the trooper violated the above standards [requiring reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity prior to seizure] articulated by the 
Supreme Court, this Court and our legislature. The information available to the 
trooper did not disclose "that criminal activity was afoot." All that the 
information possessed by the trooper disclosed was that his computer indicated no 
insurance was found on the vehicle in the database relied on by the trooper. That 
simple fact fails to disclose any suspicion that a crime was in progress for several 
reasons. 
Brief of Appellant at p. 5. Following that introduction Appellant expounded three 
reasons why no crime was observed by the officer, not that other innocent behavior could 
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explain the actions. The officer lacked sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion to 
seize Mr. Snedeker. 
The three arguments urged by Mr. Snedeker in his opening brief are summarized 
as follows: 
(1) The officer knew the vehicle was registered to a business but did not know the 
identity of who was driving the vehicle and was without any reasonable 
articulable suspicion that this driver, Mr. Snedeker, was committing a crime 
because (2) Utah law requires a driver to have knowledge that he is driving the 
uninsured vehicle and the trooper had no knowledge supporting that element of 
the crime given he did not know the driver; and (3) Utah law exempts from being 
a crime the circumstance where an uninsured vehicle is driven by an otherwise 
insured driver. 
Brief of Appellant atpp 5-7. 
These arguments do not claim otherwise innocent explanations for the insurance 
on the vehicle. Rather, these arguments reveal the lack of a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the trooper needed prior to making a seizure of the driver Mr. Snedeker. 
Accordingly, Appellee's reliance on State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, 112 P.3d at ^ 17, 
regarding other innocent explanations is both misplaced and unhelpful. That case is 
inapposite to our case at Bar. 
The bottom line here is that in stopping the vehicle, Trooper Gurley seized Mr. 
Snedeker without any information or suspicion that Mr. Snedeker was involved in 
criminal activity. This violation is visible when considering that the only information 
the trooper possessed was that his data base revealed the vehicle to belong to a business 
and that his data base erroneously indicated the vehicle was uninsured. Elements of the 
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offense as delineated by statute requires more than is suggested by Appellee. Appellee's 
claim that the trooper need only "suspect" that "the driver is violating" a traffic or 
equipment regulation before making a legal stop (Brief of Appellee at p. 7.), is 
overstated. The full statement preceding this quote used by Appellee from State v. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994), when more closely examined and reviewed in 
the full context, supports Mr. Snedeker's appeal and is as follows: 
Stopping a vehicle may also be justified when the officer has "reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as 
driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a license ... [or that] the 
driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs." 
State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Ct.App.1992); see State v. Deitman, 
739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). In the words of the United States Supreme 
Court, as long as an officer suspects that the "driver is violating any one of the 
multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations," the police officer may 
legally stop the vehicle. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400. 
Similarly, the Appellee's reliance on the Pennsylvania case is also misplaced and 
again supports Mr. Snedeker's insistence that a violation of his constitutional rights have 
occurred. In Commonwealth v. Bolton, 2003 PA Super 314, 831 A.2d 734, a single issue 
was presented for review, to wit: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the 
charging officer had probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop where he had not observed 
[that] Defendant had committed any violation of the traffic laws and was not engaged in a 
systematic program of checking vehicles for compliance with motor vehicle registration 
and financial responsibility of the laws? Id. at \ 4. The holding of the court, accordingly, 
does not address the premise claimed by Appellee. Rather, to the extent the case 
addresses the propriety of a computer readout, it does so through its detailed state statutes 
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which expressly authorize the police behavior in Pennsylvania. 
The case identifies the statutes being examined to be very different from Utah's 
controlling statutes. Pennsylvania's statutes are as follows: 
The Motor Vehicle Code authorizes police officers to stop vehicles pursuant to 
the following statute: 
Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking 
vehicles or drivers or has articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation 
of this title, he may stop a vehicle upon request or signal, for the purpose of 
checking the vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle 
identification number or engine number or the driver's license, or to secure such 
other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce 
the provisions of this title. 75 Pa.C.S.A. $ 6308(b). 
The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code further provides that, 
[n]o person shall drive or move and no owner shall knowingly permit to be driven 
or moved upon any highway any vehicle which is not registered in this 
Commonwealth..." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301(a). Additionally, "[e]very motor vehicle 
of the type required to be registered under this title which is operated or currently 
registered shall be covered by financial responsibility. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786(a). 
Bolton, 831 A.2d at ffif 9-11 (citations omitted). 
Utah's statutes are significantly different from Pennsylvania's code such that 
Bolton offers no help to Appellee but demonstrates Mr. Snedeker's point. Pennsylvania 
defines its law to provide a violation for anyone driving an unregistered or uninsured 
vehicle. Utah, on the other hand, contains the additional elements discussed in the 
opening brief requiring knowledge of the lack of insurance and the exception to the 
criminal violation which permits a driver to drive an uninsured vehicle if the driver 
himself is insured. These two distinctions illustrate that a trooper without any 
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information of these two elements can not support a stop with the requisite reasonable 
articulable suspicion. 
This Court should reverse the district order sustaining the drivers license 
suspension finding that no reasonable articulable suspicion existed for the trooper to seize 
Mr. Snedeker. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE AND REJECT THE APPELLEE'S 
ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES 
NOT APPLY FOR BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS. 
A. FAILURE TO CROSS-APPEAL 
This case came before the trial court for a trial de novo on an administrative 
appeal from the Drivers License Division on December 20, 2006. At the tria] de novo 
Mr. Snedeker moved the court to find that the trooper committed an illegal stop of Mr. 
Snedeker. R. 1-3. Counsel for Appellee objected to the motion claiming that the 
exclusionary rule did not apply to the de novo trial. R. 22 at 2. Following argument on 
that issue the trial court disagreed with counsel for Appellee and heard the evidence. R. 
22 at 4. Appellee did not object, did not request findings or conclusions on that decision 
and simply proceeded with the testimony from the trooper regarding the substance of 
Appellant's motion. R. 22 at 4. 
In State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996), the Court discussed the requirement 
of when a cross-appeal is required from the Appellee to raise a different issue than the 
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basis for affirming the decision below. In doing so, the Supreme Court approved of the 
federal approach identified as the Langnes doctrine. In Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 
(1931), the litigants are required to cross-appeal if they wish to attack a judgment of a 
lower court for the purpose of enlarging their own rights or lessening the rights of their 
opponent. South, 924 P.2d at 355, (citing Langnes, 282 U.S. at 538-39). By contrast the 
Appellee needs not cross-appeal if it merely desires the affirmance of the lower court's 
judgment. Id. at 356. 
Applying these guidelines to our case demonstrates that the Appellee's second 
point claiming to affirm the lower court's decision would require a cross-appeal. This is 
not a case as in South where the State argued for application of another similar theory to 
defeat a suppression motion. South, 924 P.2d at 357. Rather, this argument by Appellee 
would defeat the ability for any appellant to challenge a Fourth Amendment application 
to the de novo trial in district court. Such a ruling would have a very different outcome. 
While the decision would still be affirmed in that narrower sense, the Langnes doctrine 
prohibits appellees from enlarging their own rights and/or lessening the rights of 
appellants with an issue argued in its answer rather than filing its own cross-appeal. Id. at 
355-56. See Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst f ZCMI"Y, 617 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 
1980)(ruling that if the appellee wishes to argue for alteration of the judgment to enlarge 
his rights, he must file his own notice of appeal or petition within the time provided in the 
rules; the Supreme Court clarified that a cross-appeal is required particularly when he 
seeks to revive a separate claim rejected by the court below). 
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Terry v. ZCMI relied in part on old rule 75 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which Rule was appealed in 1990 at the same time the Rules of Appellate Procedure were 
adopted combining the separate appellate court rules. The Rules of Appellate Procedure 
require the same substance indicated in Terry v. ZCMI as the rationale requisite for the 
cross-appeal. Cf. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate procedure with Rule 75(d) of the old 
civil procedure rules as cited in Terry v. ZCMI. 
Appellee should not be permitted to make a cross-appeal disguised in the context 
of a second argument to affirm the lower court when that ruling has not itself been 
appealed as required by the rules, has not been preserved by the appellee and would 
reduce or lessen the rights of appellants as prohibited by the Langnes doctrine. 
JMENT IS WITHOUT MERIT 
Vrae right of Appellaftt to insist on constitutional protections against unlawful 
search and seizure, including the exclusionary rule, at a de novo trial from the 
administrative hearing at tlj 
district court de novo trial 
|e Driver's License Division is well supported. Prior to the 
H this matter, the motion to find an illegal stop was filed and 
the matter scheduled. At t 
argument pursued 
following which the 
e hearimg the Appellee orally objected to the motion and 
n. The trial court indicated it would hear the argument, 
ired Appellee to put on her witness necessarily rejecting 
her objection. R. 22 at \gYpz trial court's ruling is supported by statute and case 
authority. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15, entitled "Judicial review—Informal adjudicative 
proceedings" states, in pertinent part: 
(3)(a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and 
law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this section. 
The section identifies the application of constitutional issues to the de novo appeal from 
the Driver's License Division. 
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
"the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police 
violations of article I, section 14, of the Utah Constitution." In so holding, the Utah 
Supreme Court established a state exclusionary rule separate and distinct from the federal 
exclusionary rule and allowed for the expansion and separate analysis of the exclusionary 
rule under the Utah State Constitution. 
Under the exclusionary rule, evidence is inadmissible in some proceedings 
if it is seized in violation of constitutional protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Although the rule has been developed primarily in 
federal law, it also has application under the state constitution. As we 
observed in Larocco, a number of states have used their own constitutions 
to develop independent state search and seizure law. Our treatment of a 
separate state exclusionary rule permits us to benefit from federal analysis 
without being bound by it in our construction of the Utah Constitution. 
Sims v. Collection Div. of Utah State Tax Com'n, 841 P.2d 6, 11 (Utah 1992) 
(citing Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465). 
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In Sims, the Utah Supreme Court extended the application of the state 
exclusionary rule beyond the traditional federal application. The Utah Supreme Court 
applied the state exclusionary rule to a civil forfeiture proceeding under the Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act and held "that illegally seized evidence must be excluded under Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution where the proceeding in which exclusion is sought is 
quasi-criminal in nature or where there is a particularized need for deterrence to restrain 
improper law enforcement activities. This result shall ensue whether the proceeding in 
question is labeled "civil"or "criminal" Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added). Additionally, in 
Sims the Utah Supreme Court found that a forfeiture proceeding under the Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act was a quasi-criminal proceeding requiring the application of the 
exclusionary rule because the statute seeks to punish and deter those in possession of 
illegal drugs, enforcement is inextricably connected with proof of criminal activity by 
requiring possessors of illegal drugs to purchase drug stamps and affix them to drugs, and 
application of exclusionary rule should provide deterrent to unconstitutional seizures by 
law enforcement entities who receive money collected under statute. 
In its ruling in Sims, the Utah Supreme Court included a list of other types of civil 
proceedings which other state's courts have characterized as quasi-criminal. Among 
those types of matters on the list were proceedings such as employee discharge hearings, 
antitrust proceedings, and administrative proceedings to suspend or cancel liquor 
licenses. Sims, 841 P.2d at 13. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that civil tax 
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proceedings should also be included in that group of quasi-criminal proceedings. In that 
opinion the Court cited with approval to a case involving drivers license hearings. The 
Court cited to Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D. 1987), 
where the court ruled that a drivers license revocation proceeding for refusing to submit 
to an intoxilyzer test is a quasi-criminal proceeding. The Utah Supreme Court opined: 
The quasi-criminal nature of the tax proceeding in this case is further 
evidenced by the fact that enforcement of the Act is inextricably connected 
with proof of criminal activity. See Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 
N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D. 1987) ("[T]he civil and criminal consequences [of 
a refusal to take an intoxilyzer test] are so intermingled that they are 
not perceptibly different to a lay person/'). Violation of the Act 
necessarily involves criminal conduct and a violation of criminal law. 
Compliance with the Act presupposes the possessor's knowledge of the 
possession of illegal drugs and therefore requires a violation of criminal 
law. It would be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold that 
in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while 
in the [civil] proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal law 
has been violated, the same evidence would be admissible. 
Sims, 841 P.2d at 14 (emphasis added, citation omitted). 
Under the same analysis set forth in Sims, an administrative hearing regarding the 
suspension of a driver's driving privileges as a result of an arrest for driving under the 
influence should also be considered a quasi-criminal proceeding. First, an administrative 
drivers license hearing should be considered quasi-criminal because despite the 
legislative purpose of "protecting persons on highways" as set forth in U.C.A. § 53-3-222 
it is clear that the suspension is another form of punishment suffered by the driver as a 
result of his committing the crime of Driving Under the Influence and is intended as a 
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deterrent to future offenses. Secondly, an administrative drivers license hearing is so 
"inextricably connected" with the criminal case for DUI since it is based on the same 
exact set of facts and circumstances and in order to impose a suspension the drivers 
license division must find by a preponderance of the evidence (versus proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt necessary in the criminal case) that the driver violated one of Utah's 
DUI laws. (U.C.A. 41-6a.520(3)(a)) Furthermore, absent an actual "arrest" for DUI there 
would never be an administrative hearing. Absent an arrest the arresting officer would 
not request that the driver submit to a chemical test and every administrative hearing is 
predicated on the fact that the driver was arrested for DUI and served notice of the 
Drivers License Division's intent to deny, suspend, revoke, or disqualify the driver's 
license. (U.C.A. 41-6a-520 & U.C.A. 41-6a-521). 
The suspension of a driver's license to operate a motor vehicle clearly acts as a 
punishment to the driver as it takes away an essential privilege necessary to function in 
everyday life. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Although it is not considered a "right" 
similar to that of the right to vote or the right to privacy, the privilege to drive extended 
by the State of Utah to its citizens is an important privilege that cannot simply be taken 
away without granting the driver certain constitutional protections and due process. 
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"The loss of driving privileges is a severe deprivation that may have 
serious consequences for an individual, not the least of which is the 
possible loss of employment. 
Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Utah 1979)(emphasis added). 
The loss of one's drivers license is a very severe consequence as in our area the 
ability to drive a car is an essential part of every day life for most citizens. In many 
circumstances the loss of one's driving privileges has very far reaching consequences 
such as loss of employment and the inability to transport children to school and other 
activities, while in all reality suspending a person's drivers license certainly does not 
prevent them from driving it just prevents them from driving legally. Utah law 
specifically excludes drivers whose licenses are suspended for DUI, or drug related 
suspensions from eligibility for a hardship license under which a driver could drive to 
essential activities such as work or school, again singling out DUI offenders for special 
punishment. (U.C.A. 53-3-220(4)(a)). 
In addition to the punishment suffered as a result of the inability to drive a vehicle 
during the suspension period, there is a substantial financial penalty that results from a 
loss of one's driver's license as a result of an administrative DUI suspension. First, when 
the driver is eligible for reinstatement after the suspension period is over, he or she is 
required to pay an increased reinstatement fee of $50.00. Reinstatement after a 
suspension for DUI is the only type of reinstatement which requires a $50.00 fee. All 
other types of suspension, whether for exceeding the limit on points or failure to pay a 
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ticket, only require a $25.00 reinstatement fee. Therefore the DUI administrative 
suspensions have been singled out for additional reinstatement fees. On top of the $50.00 
reinstatement fee, a driver must also pay a $150.00 administrative fee in order to have his 
license reinstated following a suspension as a result of a DUI arrest. Only DUI 
suspensions are required to pay the special $150.00 DUI administrative fee. No other 
type of suspension is required to pay a special administrative fee. These requirements 
are termed by the Drivers License Division as reinstatement or administrative fees but 
they are only assessed against drivers whose licenses are suspended as a result of a DUI. 
Therefore, these increased punishments are unique only to DUI charges and would more 
properly be termed as fines or penalties for having committed a DUI specific offense 
serving to punish DUI offenders as well as detering future DUI offenses. In addition to 
the reinstatement and administrative fees listed above, DUI drivers are also required to 
pay a separate $230.00 impound release fee in order to have their vehicle released from 
impound. Like the other fees listed above, the impound release fee is also unique to DUI 
offenses only. 
The costs as a result of a DUI suspension do not stop there. Regardless of whether 
the driver is actually convicted of the criminal charge of DUI, if an administrative 
suspension is imposed by the Drivers License Division, a notation is placed on the 
driver's driver history indicating that the driver's license was suspended for a DUI related 
offense. This information is available and provided to the driver's auto insurance carrier 
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upon request and the driver's auto insurance rates are increased dramatically based on the 
administrative suspension regardless of whether the driver is actually convicted on the 
criminal charge of DUI. 
Finally, the Utah Legislature has recently created two new categories of drivers: 
first, the Alcohol Restricted Driver and second, the Interlock Restricted Driver. An 
Alcohol Restricted Driver is prohibited from driving a motor vehicle with any measurable 
or detectable amount of alcohol in the drivers body (U.C.A. 41-6a-530) while an 
Interlock Restricted Driver (U.C.A. 41-6a-518.2) requires certain drivers to install an 
ignition interlock device on any vehicle they operate in order to lawfully operate a 
vehicle. A violation of either restriction not only results in additional suspension of the 
driver's driving privileges but also constitutes additional crimes separate and distinct 
from a DUI. The criteria for classification as an Alcohol Restricted Driver or an 
Interlock Restricted Driver is not determined based on whether or not the driver is 
actually convicted of the crime of DUI but rather can be based solely on whether or not 
an administrative suspension has been imposed for certain alcohol related driving 
offenses. A subsequent dismissal of the criminal charge of DUI does not alter or affect 
the administrative suspension and likewise has no effect on the driver's classification as 
an Alcohol Restricted or Interlock Restricted Driver. The potential cost for an Interlock 
device is approximately $100-$ 150 for installation and an additional $75-85 per month to 
lease and insure the device while it is required to be maintained in the vehicle. Thus the 
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requirement of an Ignition Interlock device as a result of an administrative suspension 
could cost the driver thousands of dollars in order to legally operate a vehicle even after 
the suspension period has expired. 
Aside from the position that the administrative suspension acts as a penalty or 
punishment to the driver, Mr. Snedeker posits that an administrative hearing is quasi-
criminal based on the fact that the enforcement of the suspension laws is "inextricably 
connected with proof of criminal activity." As the Supreme Court stated in Sims, 
"Violation of the Act necessarily involves criminal conduct and a violation of criminal 
law." Utah's traffic code states that: 
(3) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(a) whether a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person was 
operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502, 41-6a-517, 41-6a-
530, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; and 
(b) whether the person refused to submit to the test or tests under Section 41-6a-
520. 
U.C.A. 41-6a-521(3). 
To impose a suspension following an administrative hearing, the Drivers License 
Division must find that the driver violated one of several criminal statutes pertaining to 
drunk driving. Thus, the language of U.C.A 41-6a-521 requires that in order to impose a 
suspension the Drivers License Division must find that the arresting officer had not only 
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reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop but also probable cause to arrest the driver 
for DUI, and absent such a finding, cannot impose a suspension. 
Finally, the application of exclusionary rule at DUI Administrative Hearings 
clearly would provide and additional deterrent to unconstitutional seizures by law 
enforcement seeking to arrest individuals for DUL Although the suppression of evidence 
in the criminal case already serves a deterrent to officers, it would be fundamentally 
unfair to allow officers to conduct illegal stops, detentions, and searches, and allow the 
illegally obtained evidence to form the basis for the serious sanctions to drivers such as 
the loss of driving privileges and those other sanctions and penalties listed above. 
Accordingly, this Court should find that a DUI Administrative Hearing pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 53-3-223 is in fact a quasi-criminal proceeding and therefore the exclusionary 
rule preventing the introduction or consideration of illegally obtained evidence is 
applicable in hearings and at the trial de novo in district court. This Court should deny 
the alternative claim asserted by Appellee that the exclusionary rule does not apply to 
administrative actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on what the trooper observed from his computer read-out, he lacked a 
reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed. There are no facts that the 
trooper could articulate at the time of the stop that the driver was in violation of the 
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insurance laws of this State. The officer lacked knowledge as to who the operator was at 
the time of effecting the stop: and even if he had known the driver, he was not able to 
ascertain whether the operator had an "operator's policy.5' Moreover, because proof of 
insurance on the vehicle actually was provided to the trooper once stopped, his read-out 
was in error and the stop based on that error was unsupported by reasonable suspicion 
and therefore is unconstitutional. 
Appellee's alternative argument should not be countenanced by this court for 
procedural reasons, although if considered should be rejected based on the compelling 
statutory and case authority cited above. 
Therefore, for all or any of the foregoing reasons Mr. Snedeker respectfully 
requests that the Order of the District Court denying his Petition for Judicial Review and 
upholding the suspension order issued by the Drivers License Division be overturned and 
that his drivers license be reinstated immediately. 
DATED this ^ d a y of June, 2007. 
BEM^MINA. HAMILTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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